How has Indian foreign policy evolved since
Independence?
Understanding
that is done best by dividing into six broad phases, each a response to a
different strategic environment.
The first phase from
1946-62 could be characterized as an era of optimistic non-alignment.
Its setting was very much of a bipolar world, with camps led by the United
States and the USSR. India’s objectives were to resist the constraining of its
choices and dilution of its sovereignty as it rebuilt its economy and
consolidated its integrity. Its parallel goal, as the first of the decolonized
nations, was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable world
order. This was the heyday of Bandung and Belgrade, the peak of Third World
solidarity. It also saw energetic Indian diplomacy from Korea and Vietnam to
the Suez and Hungary. For a few years, our position on the world stage seemed
assured. The 1962 conflict with China not only brought this period to an end,
but in a manner that significantly damaged India’s standing.
The second phase from 1962-71 is a decade of realism and recovery. India made pragmatic
choices on security and political challenges despite a paucity of resources. It
looked beyond non-alignment in the interest of national security, concluding a
now largely forgotten defence agreement with the U.S. in 1964. External
pressures on Kashmir mounted in this period of vulnerability. The global
context remained bipolar, but it now saw the emergence of limited cooperation
between the US and USSR. South Asia happened to be a particular area of
convergence and Indian diplomacy had to face the superpowers together, as it
did in Tashkent in 1965. It was also a period when domestic challenges were
particularly acute, ranging from political turbulence to economic distress. But
for our purposes, what is important is that even though the stress levels were
higher, we came through an anxious period without too much damage.
The third phase, from 1971 to 1991, was one of
greater Indian regional assertion. It started with the decisive
dismantlement of an India-Pakistan equivalence through creation of Bangladesh,
but ended with the IPKF misadventure in Sri Lanka. The larger environment by
now was dramatically different, with the Sino-US rapprochement of 1971 upending
the strategic landscape. The Indo-Soviet Treaty and the adoption of more
pro-Soviet positions on international issues were India’s response to this
challenge. It was a particularly complex phase as the US-China-Pakistan axis
which came into being at this time seriously threatened India’s prospects.
While they had many long-term consequences, the shift in India’s posture came
more from other factors. The collapse of USSR, its close ally, and the not
unconnected economic crisis in 1991 compelled us to look again at the first
principles of both domestic and foreign policy.
The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of a "unipolar”
world characterized the fourth phase. It encouraged a radical rethink in India on a broad
range of issues. And it shifted focus to safeguarding strategic autonomy. If
India opened up economically more to the world, its reflection was also evident
in new diplomatic priorities and approaches. The Look East policy summarized
the changed Indian approach to world affairs, which also saw adjustments in its
position on Israel. This is a period where India reached out to engage the US
more intensively, yet did so while protecting its equities in critical areas.
This quest for strategic autonomy was particularly focused on securing its nuclear
weapon option, but also visible in trade negotiations. By the turn of the
century, enough had happened for India to now shift gear again and move to a
higher level. After 1998, it was now a declared nuclear weapon power, had
fended off Pakistan’s military adventurism again in Kargil in 1999, generated
enough economic growth to be of global interest, and managed well a United
States that was focusing more on developments in Asia and the consequences of
Islamic fundamentalism.
This more competitive environment opened up
new windows of opportunity for India, especially as the United States found it
difficult to maintain the same degree of unipolarity. As a consequence, India
discovered the benefits of working with different powers on different issues. This fifth phase is one where India gradually acquired the
attributes of a balancing power. It is reflected in the India-US nuclear deal
as well as a better understanding with the West at large. At the same
time, India could also make common cause with China on climate change and
trade, and consolidate further ties with Russia while helping to fashion BRICS
into a major forum. This was, in some senses, a period of opportunity where
India moved the global needle by taking new positions.
A number of developments
came together to change calculations by 2014, initiating the sixth phase.
To begin with, China gathered more momentum and the terms of engagement it
offered to the world progressively hardened. Balancing works best during a
period of transition and was, therefore, inevitably mitigated as new realities
took root. At the other extreme, the American trumpet sounded increasingly
uncertain. U.S. resource limitation was aggravated by risk aversion in the
aftermath of the Iraq war. Declaring an Afghan withdrawal and displaying
growing tepidity in the Asia-Pacific sent messages well beyond the immediate
issues. For its part, Europe too turned increasingly inwards, not appreciating
that political agnosticism would have its own cost. Japan’s efforts to acquire a
greater say continued to unfold only gradually. The full impact of the 2008
financial crisis and global economic rebalancing made itself felt in a variety
of ways. As the world saw a wider dispersal of power and more localized
equations, it was evident that multi-polarity was now seriously upon us.
Clearly, this called for a very different approach than practicing politics
with a more limited set of dominant players.
Faced with all these developments and
assessing the state of global regimes and coalitions, India chose to turn to
more energetic diplomacy. It did so recognizing that we were now entering a
world of convergences and issue-based arrangements. This awareness was
accompanied by a growing sense of its own capabilities. What it has brought out
is not just the limitations of others, but the expectations that the world has
of India. That we have emerged among the major economies of the world is one
factor, though admittedly the most important. The relevance of our talent to
global technology is another, one likely to grow in time. Our ability to
shoulder greater responsibilities at a time when the world is more reticent is
also evident. Equally significant is a willingness to shape key global
negotiations, such as in Paris on climate change. The investment of greater
resources in development partnerships with countries of the South was also
noteworthy. And not least, the manner in which we have approached our own
region and the extended neighbourhood has resonated beyond.
India’s
diplomatic agenda has broadened considerably, as indeed have its partners in
those endeavours. We share with the international community the objective that
a multi-polar world should have a multi-polar Asia at its core. And to ensure
that, India needs to follow an approach of working with multiple partners on
different agendas. Obviously, they would each have their importance and
priority. But Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas is today as relevant in
foreign policy. It is the nations who have an optimal mix of capabilities,
relationships and positioning who can aspire to occupy the multiple poles of
the emerging international order. And it is the confidence of being able to
forge ahead in this looser architecture that can inspire us to emerge as a
leading power in the future.
Each of the six phases have had their highs
and lows. Infact the ending of one could be the beginning of another. The 1971
Bangladesh war or the 1998 nuclear tests stand out in the positive category.
But the negative ones perhaps were more directly responsible for substantial
changes of course. The 1962 reverse vis-à-vis China was one example. The
combination of events as diverse as the Gulf War, the break-up of USSR,
economic stagnation and domestic turbulence coming together in 1991 was another.
Therefore, while not being dogmatic about the past, it is just as important not
to be dismissive about it . This is crucial to appreciate because there are
both strains of continuity and change in our policy. Conceptually, each period
could be visualized as the overlay on the previous one, rather than either a
negation or just an extrapolation. Thus, the independent mindset that drove
non-alignment and then protected our strategic equities can today be better
expressed in multiple partnerships.
So
what does the past teach us? Seven decades of foreign policy certainly offer a
lot of lessons, especially if we contemplate a challenging road ahead. They
span a broad spectrum, both in time and in outcomes. A dispassionate assessment
of our performance would note that while we ourselves have done well in many
respects, many competitors have done much better. Overcoming many challenges,
India consolidated its national unity and integrity. That was not a given,
noting that some other diverse societies like USSR and Yugoslavia did not make
it in the same period. A modern economy with industrial capacities was
developed over time, even as our reliance on nature was mitigated in
agriculture. Defence preparedness was improved and one of the key accomplishments
of diplomacy was to enable access to multiple sources of equipment and
technology. However, the fact remains that even after seven decades of
independence, many of our borders remain unsettled. In the economic sphere, we
may look good when benchmarked against our own past. It seems a little
different when compared to China or South East Asia. So what really matters is
to develop a sharp awareness about our own performance. And the lessons of that
exercise can be captured in five baskets of issues.